FKB’s client is a solo practitioner with extensive experience in commercial litigation. The matter arose from the defendant attorney’s representation of a corporation (the “Corporation”) in an action for breach of contract against another entity with which it previously had a business relationship.

During the course of the defendant attorney’s representation, the Corporation obtained a judgment in excess of $1M. Over the course of ten years, the defendant attorney attempted to execute on the judgment, seizing assets worth over $700,000 for the Corporation; however, the Corporation raised many disputes with respect to the propriety of the defendant attorney’s actions. In 2013, the defendant attorney commenced a fee action against the Corporation. In response, the Corporation asserted fourteen counterclaims against the attorney seeking significant monetary damages and alleging egregious violations of Judiciary Law §487, the Professional Rules of Conduct, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and various other intentional torts.

In response to the counterclaim complaint, FKB file a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (a)(5), and (a)(7) seeking dismissal of the counterclaims on the grounds that, inter alia, the Corporation failed to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements for fraud and Judiciary Law §487 violations, and that many of the counterclaims were merely duplicative of a time-barred legal malpractice claim. FKB argued that the Corporation attempted to disguise the time-barred legal malpractice claim as various other causes of action simply to take advantage of a longer statute of limitations period.

Following oral argument, in a Decision and Order dated March 19, 2015, Justice Manuel J. Mendez agreed with the legal arguments set forth in FKB’s motion to dismiss and granted the motion in its entirety. Justice Mendez held that the Corporation failed to adequately plead “egregious conduct or a chronic and extreme pattern of behavior,” thereby failing to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements for the elements of fraud and violations of Judiciary Law §487. Moreover, Justice Mendez agreed with FKB’s arguments that the Corporation’s fourteen causes of action were merely &dressed up” claims for legal malpractice, many made “under the guise of Judiciary Law §487,” which were plainly time-barred.

If you have any questions about this case, or the defense of attorneys in general, please contact Andrew S. Kowlowitz or Stefanie A. Singer.